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Knowledge, Intent, System, and Motive: A Much Needed
Return to the Requirement of Independent Relevance
I. INTRODUCTION

There are few truths more reliable in common experience than the adage that
a person behaves in conformity with his character; that the outward manifestation
of personality comports with the inner self.' Therefore, in a trial of a person for
stealing, it would seem quite relevant that she has stolen before. After all, it is
more likely, in the large scheme of things, that "once a thief, always a thief." Used
as circumstantial evidence in the trial for a present theft, an earlier theft would be
relevant to establish that this proven thief has stolen in the instant case.2
Louisiana Code of Evidence articles 401 and 402 posit the general rule which
applies to all evidence. If the evidence tends to establish or disestablish a material
point in controversy, then, unless there is a specific constitutional or legislative
exception, the evidence is admissible.3 Thus, unless this obviously relevant
evidence is specifically excluded by the Code of Evidence or other law, evidence
of a prior act will be admissible to prove propensity.
Despite the obvious relevance and probity of character as evidence, there
is a firmly entrenched rule that "[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of
his character ... is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted
in conformity therewith on a particular occasion ... '" Article 404 provides

Copyright 1994, by LoUIsIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. "[O]ur sins testify against us .... " Isaiah 59:12 (King James).
2.
[E]vidence that an individual is the kind of person who tends to behave in certain
ways almost always has some value as circumstantial evidence as to how he acted (and
perhaps with what state of mind) in the matter in question. By and large, persons reputed
to be violent commit more assaults than persons known to be peaceable.
1 McCormick on Evidence § 188, at 793 (John W. Strong et al." eds., 4th ed. 1992) (footnote
omitted).
The fact that a defendant has committed another crime has logical relevancy; it tends
to show that he has a "criminal disposition" and thus is more likely to have committed
this particular crime than a defendant without such apropensity. If the evidence indicates
that defendant has committed the same type of crime, e.g., proof of another theft in a
prosecution for theft, the evidence has even greater relevancy.
George W. Pugh, Louisiana Evidence Law 31 (1974).
3. La. Code Evid. art. 401 provides: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
La. Code Evid. art. 402 provides: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Louisiana, this Code of
Evidence, or other legislation. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
4. La. Code Evid. art. 404(A). Fed. R. Evid. 404(a) provides: "Evidence of a person's
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on aparticular occasion .. " Both the Federal Rules ofEvidence and the Louisiana Code
of Evidence list exceptions which are substantially similar. None of these exceptions are pertinent
to this paper.
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the legislated exception to the general rule that all relevant evidence is
admissible.
The reason why relevant and probative evidence is excluded generally is its
prejudicial effect on the jury. McCormick puts it this way:
[E]vidence of character in any form-reputation, opinion from observation, or specific acts-generally will not be received to prove that a person
engaged in certain conduct or did so with a particular intent on a specific
occasion, so-called circumstantial use of character. The reason is the
familiar one of prejudice outweighing probative value. Character
evidence used for this purpose, while typically being of relatively slight
value, usually is laden with the dangerous baggage of prejudice, distraction, time consumption and surprise.5
Thus, it is not a question of probity or relevance; it is a question of prejudice.
Because of the tension between the need for this obviously probative and
relevant evidence and the very real prejudice it may cause to a defendant, the
American legal system has created many exceptions to the general rule that
character evidence cannot be used to prove propensity towards certain behavior.
This comment will not attempt to address all, or even most, of these exceptions.
Rather, this comment will concentrate on a few, distinct exceptions. Further
limiting the scope, this comment will only address the applicability of these
exceptions when the prosecutor in a criminal action offers evidence of specific acts
of the defendant against the defendant.
The exceptions to be discussed are those generally termed "knowledge,"
"intent," "motive," and "plan." These exceptions are ones in which specific
instances of conduct can be presented against a defendant and result, in fact if not
in theory, in establishing the defendant's propensity towards specific criminal
behavior.
The course this comment will take is as follows: (1) a general introduction to
the rationale behind each of these exceptions-the requirement of independent
relevance; (2) a brief look at peripheral procedural issues impacting on this area of
the law; (3) a review of Louisiana cases, followed by an analysis of the reasoning
applied in those cases; (4) a brief discussion of a relatively new doctrine which is
radically and detrimentally affecting this area of the law-the depraved sexual
instinct; and (5) a conclusion of the current state of the law, followed by some
modest recommendations.

5.

McCormick, supra note 2, § 189, at 793. See also, Pugh, supra note 2, at 31:
Evidence relevant solelyto show adefendant's criminal disposition is termed character
evidence, and the state's use of character evidence has generally been deemed to create
an inordinate risk of unjust convictions because of these factors: the strong possibility of
the jury convicting defendant merely because he is a bad man, the injustice of attacking
defendant on an issue for which he is probably unprepared; and the danger of confusing
the jury by proof of collateral issues.
(footnotes omitted).
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II. THE REQUIREMENT OF INDEPENDENT RELEVANCE

What, exactly, is "independent relevance"? If, as traditionally accepted, the
evidence must not be introduced solely to establish propensity, then the evidence
must tend to establish some other thing.6 And, as Articles 401 and 402 provide,
the other thing must be relevant.
The first sentence of Article 404(B) posits the general rule that specific
instances of a person's conduct are inadmissible if the purpose of introducing the
evidence is solely to establish the defendant's propensity towards certain behavior.
The second sentence of that article, while appearing to establish an exception to this
general rule, in reality establishes that specific instances of a person's conduct are
admissible if the evidence is introduced to prove something other than a person's
propensity towards specific behavior. This is the rule of independent relevance.
Article 404(B)(1) states:
Except as provided in Article 412, evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or
accident, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of
the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding.'

6. Abraham P. Ordover, in Balancingthe PresumptionsofGuilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b),
608(b) and 609(a), 38 Emory LJ. 135 (1989), notes the conceptual difficulty in distinguishing

whether evidence of a specific act of a defendant is or is not inadmissible character evidence:
Sometimes we lawyers are too clever. We create conceptual distinctions which, though
capable of articulation, are not always capable of application either by ourselves or by the
juries that ultimately must deal with them....
Take, for instance, the conceptual distinction between the first and second sentences of
Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The first sentence provides for the
exclusion of evidence of a defendant's other bad acts and crimes when that evidence is
offered by the prosecution to prove that the defendant has a criminal disposition or a
propensity for committing crime. The second sentence creates an exception for evidence
offered not to prove character but some relevant issue in the case, such as intent, identity,
lack of accident, motive or some other non-character issue.
Our ability to distinguish between the improper first-sentence purpose and the proper
second-sentence purposes is frequently limited.
Id.
at 135 (footnotes omitted).
7. It should be noted that, subsequent to the writing of this comment, the Louisiana
Legislature, in 1994 La. Acts No. 51 (3d Ex. Sess.), amended Article 404(B) to read as follows:
B. Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. (1) Except as provided in Article 412. evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge.
identity, absence of mistake or accident, providedthat upon request by the accused, the
prosecutionin a criminalcase shallprovide reasonablenotice in advance oftrial,of the
natureof any such evidence it intends to introduceat trialfor such purposes,or when it
relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the
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Each of these exceptions to the general rule exists because it has independent
relevance; i.e., it serves to establish a critical element of the prosecution's case
against the defendant, rather than solely to attack her character Nonetheless, it
is indisputable that each of these exceptions allows evidence of past bad acts before
the jury. The jury could attach undue weight to these acts, resulting in convicting
the defendant, not of the crime for which she is charged, but for being, in general,
a "bad character." Thus, these exceptions should be used with great caution.9

subject of the present proceeding.
(emphasis added).

The Amendment added the italicized notice requirement. In the same act, the Legislature added a
note to Article 404 which states: "The burden of proof in a pretrial hearing held in accordance with
State v. Prieur shall be identical to the burden of proof required by Federal Rules of Evidence Article
404."
It is unknown what the ultimate effect of this amendment will be, but it is an effort by the
legislature to bring Article 404(B) more in line with its federal counterpart. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)
states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of
trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the
general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
Although the ultimate effect of this amendment is unknown at the time of this writing, some
possibilities are discussed infra text accompanying note 26.
8. [W]hile other crimes evidence is inadmissible when relevant only to show defendant's
criminal disposition, it may be admissible if it bears some relevancy independent of
character.... lit is generally recognized that the admissibility of defendant's other crimes
turns on the independent relevancy vel non of the evidence to some material issue other
than defendant's character.
Pugh, supra note 2, at 31-32 (footnotes omitted). It should be noted that by "a critical element of

the prosecution's case," it is not meant that each of these exceptions are elements of the crime with
which the defendant is charged. In some cases, such as intent and knowledge, the exceptions are
elements of a crime in the traditional sense. In other cases, such as motive and system, they are,
rather, essential for the prosecutor to establish in order to convince the jury of the defendant's guilt.
9. Specific instances of an accused's conduct has been held admissible to corroborate the
victim's testimony in sexual abuse cases, to prove that the act happened, and to prove the lustful
disposition of the defendant. See infra part VIII.
Thus, it would seem that Louisiana has adopted the inclusionary approach to La. Code Evid. art.
404(B). The exclusionary approach posits that the list is exclusive, and unless the other uncharged
act fits within one of the enumerated exceptions, the act is inadmissible character evidence. The
inclusionary approach posits the notion that the list is illustrative only. If the act is introduced for
some other purpose than to establish propensity, then the act is not introduced for the purpose of
showing that the defendant is a bad woman. As such, the uncharged act falls outside the prohibition
of Article 404(B). See generally Amber Donner-Froelich, Comment, Other Crimes Evidence to Prove
the Corpus Delicti ofa Child Sexual Offense, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 217 (1985); Edward G. Mascolo,
Uncharged-Misconduct Evidence and the Issue of Intent: Limiting the Need for Admissibility, 67

Conn. B.J. 281 (1993).
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An attentive reader of Article 404(B) will notice that many of the enumerated
exceptions are, or can be, elements of a criminal charge, such as identity, intent,
knowledge, preparation, or plan. Further, the other exceptions, while not usually
an element of any crime, are familiar as necessary elements a prosecution
frequently must establish in order to get a conviction. These exceptions, such as
motive, opportunity, or absence of mistake, are elements which any successful
prosecutor will try to establish.
For example, in a typical prosecution, the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the following: a crime was committed; the defendant committed the crime;
and the defendant held, at the moment of the commission of the crime, the requisite
criminal intent if the crime has that element. As can be seen, identity is an essential
element in eachcriminal prosecution. Intent is almost always an essential element
of a crime. Knowledge is frequently an essential element of a criminal charge, such
as in a prosecution for the possession of stolen goods.
Further, as earlier noted, the prosecution should establish that the defendant
had the opportunity to commit the crime, that the defendant had a motive to commit
this crime, and sometimes that the defendant planned or prepared for the crime.
While the correlation is not perfect, clearly there is a great degree of similarity
between the enumerated exceptions in Louisiana Code of Evidence article 404(B)
and the elements that a prosecutor must or should establish at trial.
Therefore, unless "independent relevance" has some other meaning, any time
a defendant pleads not guilty, the prosecution would be able to introduce other acts
of the defendant to establish her identity, knowledge, intent, and other listed
exceptions. Recognizing this, the courts have established the general principle that
the evidence must be germane to some "genuine" issue at trial.'0
It will become clear, as the cases in this comment are examined, that some
courts are confused as to when one of these elements becomes a "genuine issue"
at trial. The following example will illustrate the problem. In a typical prosecution
of a murder, the police investigation uncovers evidence, such as fingerprints,
witnesses, and a murder weapon, which convinces the prosecuting attorney that
murder was committed and fhat a particular person has committed the murder.
Further investigation will or will not uncover that person's opportunity" and
motive for the crime. As the investigation progresses, the prosecuting attorney will
know whether there are fingerprints, blood-type matches, witnesses, and other

10. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 377 So. 2d 259, 263 (La. 1979).
11. If the defendant intends to offer an alibi as a defense, then La. Code Crim. P. art. 727
comes into play. That article provides in part:
A. Upon written demand of the district attorney stating the time, date, and place at
which the alleged offense was committed, the defendant shall serve within ten days, or
at such time as the court may direct, upon the district attorney a written notice of his
intention to offer a defense of alibi. Such notice by the defendant shall state the specific
place or places at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged
offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely to
establish such alibi.
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direct or circumstantial evidence which he can present to the grand jury to indict
a particular person for the commission of the crime.
As soon as the defendant has been arrested for the crime, she has the right to
a determination whether the state had probable cause to arrest her unless the grand
jury has already indicted her.' 2 At this preliminary examination, the prosecution
must establish, through the introduction of evidence, that probable cause exists that

the defendant c6mmitted a crime. The defendant may or may not introduce
evidence, but the prosecution must do so to detain the defendant--else the
presumption of innocence is not rebutted.
In this hearing, or during the grand jury's investigation, the theory of the
prosecution's case becomes clear. In a general sense, the defendant gets an idea of
what evidence will be presented against her.' 3 Although Louisiana's provisions
in criminal discovery are not as liberal as the civilian counterpart, there are
provisions which provide a defendant with the means to discover much which was
not disclosed by the prosecuting attorney at the preliminary examination or at the
grand jury hearing.' 4

12. La. Code Crim. P. art. 292 provides in part: "The court, on request of the state or the
defendant, shall immediately order a preliminary examination in felony cases unless the defendant
has been indicted by a grand jury."
La. Code Crim. P. art. 296 provides in part:
If the defendant has not been indicted by a grand jury for the offense charged, the court
shall, at the preliminary examination, order his release from custody or bail if, from the
evidence adduced, it appears that there is not probable cause to charge him with the
offense or with a lesser included offense. If the defendant is ordered held upon afinding
of probable cause, the court shall fix his bail if he is entitled to bail.
13. See generally La. Code Crim. P. arts. 291-298.
14. La. Code Crim. P. art. 718 provides in part:
Subject to the limitation of Article 723, on motion of the defendant, the court shall order
the district attorney to permit or authorize the defendant to inspect, copy, examine, test
scientifically, photograph, or otherwise reproduce books, papers, documents, photographs,
tangible objects, buildings, places, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the
possession, custody, or control of the state, and which:
(1) are favorable to the defendant and which are material and relevant only to the
issue of guilt or punishment, or
(2) are intended for use by the state as evidence at the trial, or
(3) were obtained from or belong to the defendant.
La. Code Crim. P. art. 719 provides:
Upon motion of the defendant, the court shall order the district attorney to permit or
authorize the defendant to inspect and copy, photograph, or otherwise reproduce any
results or reports, or copies thereof, of physical or mental examination, and of scientific
tests or experiments, made in connection with or material to the particular case, that are
in the possession, custody, control, or knowledge of the district attorney and intended for
use at trial. Exculpatory evidence shall be produced under this article even though it is
not intended for use at trial.
La. Code Crim. P. arts. 716 (statements by the defendant), 717 (defendant's prior criminal record),
721 (hearsay statements of co-conspirators), 722 (confessions and inculpatory statements of
codefendants), and 729 (time and scope of motion by defendant) are also available to the defendant.
There are constitutional dimensions to the area of discovery as well. See generally Brady v.
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Thus, prior to trial, the defense has an idea of the prosecution's theory of the
case and what evidence will be introduced against her to prove that theory. By the
same token, the prosecution knows what issues will be hotly contested and which
will not. He knows whether there is an eyewitness to the killing, and he knows
whether there is evidence that links the defendant to the crime sufficiently that he
can attempt a successful prosecution. From this knowledge, the prosecutor knows
what will be a genuine issue at trial. He knows what evidence will be needed to
establish his theory of the case.
If the prosecution's case is relatively weak in terms of direct evidence linking
the defendant to the crime, such as few or no eye-witnesses to the crime, then the
prosecution must more heavily rely on circumstantial evidence to prove the
defendant committed the crime. In a case such as this, prior acts of the defendant
which are similar would tend to establish both identity and system.
If the degree of similarity is great, then the other acts, independent of evidence
relevant to the present crime, would tend to establish the "signature" of the
defendant. Since the defendant once committed an almost identical and unique act,
the likelihood of another person doing the same act is virtually impossible. This
leads to the inference that the defendant committed the act under evaluation. 5 On
the other hand, if the prosecution has an eyewitness to the crime and has sufficient
direct and circumstantial evidence to link the defendant to the crime, then the other
acts of the defendant are unnecessary to establish identity and should be excluded.16

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), and its progeny.
15. See McCormick, supra note 2. § 190, at 801-03, which defines these types of crimes as
crimes by the accused so nearly identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork
of the defendant. Much more is demanded than the mere repeated commission of crimes
of the same class, such as repeated murders, robberies or rapes. The pattern and
characteristics of the crime must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.
(footnotes omitted).
'he Louisiana test has been articulated as follows:
In order to be admissible the extraneous offense must meet several tests: (1) there must
be clear and convincing evidence of the commission of the other crimes and the
defendant's connection therewith; (2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in
both the charged and the uncharged offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one
must logically say they are the work of the same person; (3) the other crimes evidence
must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that the
defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character; (4) the
other crimes evidence must tend to prove a material fact genuinely at issue; (5) the
probative value of the extraneous crimes evidence must out weigh its prejudicial effect.
State v. Hatcher, 372 So. 2d 1024, 1033 (La. 1979) (on rehearing) (citations omitted). See also State
v. Car, 620 So. 2d 288 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993). The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the first
circuit because the lower court incorrectly applied the test. State v. Carr, 620 So. 2d 1325 (La.
1993). Nevertheless, the test was correctly stated.
16. In a case such as this, the evidence should be excluded, not because the evidence has lost
any of its relevance, but because it is "merely repetitive and cumulative, is ... a subterfuge for
depicting the defendant's bad character or his propensity for bad behavior, and [does not] serve[] the
actual purpose for which it is offered." State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126, 130 (La. 1973).
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This is true of the other exceptions. If the prosecution is able to establish

through traditional means that the defendant did the act under evaluation, then the
other acts of the defendant should not be admissible, since there is no genuine
dispute as to that element of the crime."
One manner in which a genuine dispute arises is in the case where the
defendant places that element at issue.'8 For example, if the defendant admits to
committing the proscribed act but denies that she knew doing so would have

criminal consequences, then the argument arises that the prosecution should be able
to introduce other acts of the defendant to rebut the defendant's claim of innocent
intent or lack of guilty knowledge. 9
However, at least until recently, a defendant's mere plea of "not guilty" did not
put any of these elements at issue. 20 As will be seen, this rule is currently
weakened.2'

17. For a case which exemplifies how this exception should not be employed, see State v.
Davis, 411 So. 2d 2 (La. 1982). The defendant was convicted of second degree murder. The
evidence at issue was testimony that the defendant had beaten the victim three times in the past. The
defendant testified that he had only beaten the victim once. The defendant claimed that the victim
had died as a result of smoking marijuana, getting drunk, and failing down too many times. Ruling
that the evidence was admissible, the court stated:
Evidence of these prior beatings does seem relevant. The theory of defense throughout
the case appeared to be that the victim was intoxicated and was falling on her face. The
three extraneous acts introduced to the jury have independent relevance to prove that the
defendant did inflict the injuries sustained by the victim and are not too remote.
Id. at 5. As noted earlier, it is not a question of relevance; it is a question of prejudice. This
statement translates into: "He beat her three times before, therefore he probably did it this time as
well." This is a clear violation of the prohibition against the use of character evidence to establish
propensity.
18. A classic example of this is when the defendant admits the act but asserts that the state has
acted to entrap her. This defense tries to establish that, had the state not tempted the defendant into
criminal behavior, she would not have engaged in the behavior. To negate this defense, the
prosecution is allowed to introduce other, similar acts to prove the defendant's predisposition to
commit the crime. The distinction between predisposition and propensity is nebulous indeed and
goes beyond the scope of this paper. For a thoughtful discussion of this subject, see W. H. Johnson,
III, Proving a Criminal Predisposition: Separating the Unwary Innocent From the Unwary Criminal,
43 Duke L.J. 384 (1993).
19. "The price a defendant must pay for attempting to prove his good name is to throw open
the entire subject which the law has kept closed for his benefit and to make himself vulnerable where
the law otherwise shields him." Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 479, 679 S. Ct. 213, 220
(1948).
20. Ordinarily, the mere plea of not guilty does not place the question of intent at issue.
Essentially, the defendant is contending by this plea that he did not commit the crime, not
that the act was done without the requisite criminal intent, There is substantial authority
in support of the proposition that a plea of not guilty does not place intent in issue unless
the defendant's theory of the case is based upon one of the many lack-of-intent defenses.
Defenses that would place intent in issue include entrapment, coercion, and mistake or
accident. Intent would also be placed in issue if the defendant claimed that he had once
joined a conspiracy but left it before the criminal enterprise.
Ordover, supra note 6, at 151-52 (footnotes omitted).
21. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991); State v. Thompson, 532 So.
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II. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS

Because of the almost certain possibility that a jury will improperly use
evidence of prior acts, Louisiana has established a variety of procedural safeguards
against prosecutorial abuse. As will be seen, however, because the need for this
evidence is great in some cases to sustain a conviction, there are countervailing
jurisprudential doctrines which allow convictions to stand--even when these
safeguards are violated.
In Louisiana, the courts have established a test for admissibility, which has
been quoted in several cases.' It should be noted that this test applies any time
the prosecution attempts to invoke the exceptions to introduce other crimes
evidence against a defendant in the prosecution's case-in-chief. These safeguards
arenot applicable in the following situations: cross-examining a character witness
of acts of a defendant; 3 introduction of criminal convictions of a defendant when
the defendant chooses to testify;' rebuttal witnesses called by the prosecution

2d 1160 (La. 1988). Estelle is discussed more fully infra note 75. Thompson is discussed more fully
infra text accompanying notes 63-69.
22. See, e.g., State v. Code, 627 So. 2d 1373, 1381 (La. 1993); State v. Jackson, 625 So. 2d
146, 149 (La. 1993).
23. The defendant has, by putting her good chaiacter at issue, "opened the door" to her own
character. By doing so, it is proper for the prosecution to rebut the defendant's claim that she is too
good of a woman to have committed the crime. By the same token, the relevance of the specific acts
of the defendant are not introduced to impugn the character of the defendant; rather, the evidence is
relevant to determine whether the character witness has sufficient knowledge of the defendant to form
a correct opinion of her reputation. See La. Code Evid. art. 608(C): "A witness who has testified
to the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness may be cross-examined as to
whether he has heard about particular acts of that witness bearing upon his credibility." For a critical
look at this practice, see Tarleton D. Williams, Jr., Witness Impeachment by Evidence of PriorFelony
Convictions, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 893 (1992).
24. La. Code Evid. art. 609.1 provides in part:
(A) General criminal rule. In a criminal case, every witness by testifying subjects
himself to examination relative to his criminal convictions, subject to limitations set forth
below.
(B) Convictions. Generally, only offenses for which the witness has been convicted
are admissible upon the issue of his credibility, and no inquiry is permitted into matters
for which there has only been an arrest, the issuance of an arrest warrant, an indictment,
a prosecution, or an acquittal.
(C) Details of convictions. Ordinarily, only the fact of a conviction, the name of the
offense, the date thereof, and the sentence imposed is admissible. However, details of the
offense may become admissible to show the true nature of the offense:
(1) When the witness has denied the conviction or denied recollection thereof;
(2) When the witness has testified to exculpatory facts or circumstances surrounding
the conviction; or
(3) When the probative value thereof outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.
La. Code Evid. art. 803(22) provides:
Evidence ofa final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon
a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or
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when the defendant has put character at issue;2 or when the other acts introduced
by the prosecution are integral parts of the crime which is under evaluation.
First, the court must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the other
crime or act occurred and that the defendant committed the act. 6

imprisonment in excess of six months, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment.
This exception does not permit the prosecutor in a criminal prosecution to offer as
evidence the judgment of conviction of a person other than the defendant, except for the
purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness. The pendency of an appeal may be
shown but does not affect admissibility.
25. See State v. Kelly, 456 So. 2d 642, 649 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 461 So. 2d 312
(1984).
26. See, e.g., State v. Talbert, 416 So. 2d 97, 99 (La. 1982). This would ordinarily be
determined by a pre-trial hearing under La. Code Evid. art. 104(A). The so-called "Prieur" hearing
is discussed infra note 27. However, it seems sufficient that the hearing is conducted prior to the
introduction of the evidence. Article 104 provides, in pertinent part:
A. Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the
competency or qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions
of Paragraph B. In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence
except those with respect to privileges.
B. Relevancy conditioned on fact. Subject to other provisions of this Code, when the
relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall
admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding
of the fulfillment of the condition.
In the federal system, both the standard of proof and the timing of the satisfaction of that burden
are significantly different. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S. Ct. 1496 (1988).
The defendant was convicted for possession of 500 stolen video tapes. The other crimes evidence
at issue was that the defendant had previously sold stolen televisions from the same store as he sold
the stolen tapes. The district judge did not establish prior to trial that the televisions in the previous
alleged crime were, in fact, stolen. In answering whether such a preliminary finding is necessary,
the court stated:
We conclude that a preliminary finding by the court that the Government has proved the
act by a preponderance of the evidence is not called for under Rule 104(a) ....
In the
Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably
conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor. In the instant case,
the evidence that petitioner was selling the televisions was relevant under the Government's theory only if the jury could reasonably find that the televisions were stolen.
Such questions of relevance conditioned on a fact are dealt with under Federal Rule of
Evidence 104(b)....
In determining whether the Government has introduced sufficient evidence to meet Rule
104(b), the trial court neither weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the Government
has proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence. The court simply
examines all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could reasonably find'
the conditional fact-here, that the televisions were stolen-by a preponderance of the
evidence.
Id at 689-90, 108 S. Ct. at 1501 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
See also United States v. Mihm, 13 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Fitzherbert, 13
F.3d 340 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1627 (1994). Compare United States v.
Ridlehuber, 11 F.3d 516, 522-23 (5th Cir. 1993): "[T]he Court must address the threshold question
of whether the government offered sufficient proof demonstrating that the defendant committed the
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Second, the defendant must be given advance notice of the intention of the
prosecutor to use other crimes evidence at trial. This notice must describe with
some degree of particularity the offenses which the prosecution intends to offer.

alleged extrinsic offense. 'If the proof is insufficient, the judge must exclude the evidence because
it is irrelevant."' (citations omitted) (quoting United States v, Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 913 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S. Ct. 1244 (1979)). However, since the judge must first
determine that the defendant committed the act, this would be a 104(a) determination rather than a
104(b) conditional relevance test.
While Huddleston is a federal case, the reasoning might be applicable in Louisiana as our La. Code
Evid. art. 104(B) also allows for conditioned relevance. However, La. Code Evid. art. 1103, which
statutorily adopts the clear and convincing standard, limits that standard only to La. Code Evid. arts.
104(A) and 404(B).
The 1994 amendment to Article 404(B) and the accompanying note (see supra note 7), indicate
that the Legislature intends for the pre-trial hearing to follow Huddleston's test; i.e., whether a
reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant committed the act under evaluation as discussed
earlier in this footnote.
Since this is a note to Article 404, it is guidance only-not law. La. Code Evid. art. 1103, as
discussed above, would be the law, requiring the state to prove that the defendant committed the act
by clear and convincing evidence.
For a critical look at Huddleston, see Bennett L, Gershman, Symposium, The New Prosecutors,
53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 393 (1992); Dale A. Nance, ConditionalRelevance Reinterpreted,70 B.U. L. Rev.
447 (1990); Ordover, supra note 6. See Judith M.G. Patterson, Evidence of Prior Bad Acts:
Admissibility Under the Federal Rules, 38 Baylor L. Rev. 331 (1986), for a discussion of the
differing standards which have been applied.
27. State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973). This protection arises from the Due Process
clauses of the U.S. Const. amend. XIV and La. Const. art. I, § 10. See, e.g., State v. Plater, 606 So.
2d 824, 827 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992). In the federal system, the notice requirements are expressly
provided for in Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
The safeguards articulated in Prieurare:
(1) The State shall within a reasonable time before trial furnish in writing to the
defendant a statement of the acts or offenses it intends to offer, describing same with the
general particularity required of an indictment or information. No such notice is required
as to evidence of offenses which are a part of the res gestae, or convictions used to
impeach defendant's testimony.
(2) In the written statement the State shall specify the exception to the general
exclusionary rule upon which it relies for the admissibility of the evidence of other acts
or offenses.
(3) Prerequisite to the admissibility of the evidence is a showing by the State that the
evidence of other crimes is not merely repetitive and cumulative, is not a subterfuge for
depicting the defendant's bad character or his propensity for bad behavior, and that it
serves the actual purpose for which it is offered.
(4) When the evidence is admitted before the jury, the court, if requested by defense
counsel, shall charge the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence is received
and is to be considered.
(5) Moreover, the final charge to the jury shall contain a charge of the limited purpose
for which the evidence was received, and the court shall at this time advise the jury that
the defendant cannot be convicted for any charge other than the one named in the
indictment or one responsive thereto.
Prieur,277 So. 2d at 130.
La. Code Evid. art. 1103 appears to statutorily adopt this standard. However, that article states:
"Those cases are law and apply to Articles 404(B) and 104(A), unless modified by subsequent state
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Third, the judge must give the jury limiting instructions on the use of the
evidence.?
Fourth, the prosecution must establish that the other crimes or acts satisfy one
29
of the exceptions listed in Article 404(B)(1).
Finally, the judge must be satisfied that the probative value of the evidence
outweighs the prejudicial effect of the evidence.
In addition to the test indicated above, it should also be noted that Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure article 7703o and the doctrine of harmless error 3
impact on this area of the law.

jurisprudential development." This appears to mean that it is not merely Prieur (and Hamilton and
Moore) which were adopted, but all of their progeny as well.
Finally, it should be noted that this is a procedural protection. If the defense counsel fails to
timely object, then the protection is lost. See, e.g., State v. Kahey, 436 So. 2d 475, 483 (La. 1983);
State v. Wisinger, 618 So. 2d 923, 927 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 625 So. 2d 1063 (1993);
State v. Berryhill, 562 So. 2d 1105, 1110 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990); State v. Burrow, 565 So. 2d 972,
975 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 60 (1991).
Note also that no Prieur notice need be given if the other crimes evidence is used for impeachment
purposes. See Prieur safeguard number 1, supra. See also State v. Talbert, 416 So. 2d 97 (La.
1982). Nor is there any requirement of a Prieur notification if the other crimes evidence is used to
establish a continuing scheme. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 377 So. 2d 259 (La. 1979). Nor is notice
required if the other crimes evidence is admitted as part of the body, or res gestae, of the crime. See,
e.g., State v. Dupre, 369 So. 2d 1303 (La. 1979).
It is also unknown whether the placement of the language in the 1994 amendment to Article
404(B) means that the prosecution in a criminal case only has to provide notice for the enumerated
exceptions (plan, preparation, etc.)-but not when the act is part of the res gestae. The placement
of the amendment, separating the enumerated exceptions from the res gestae exception, would suggest
that this was the intent of the Legislature. This would be in accord with the above cited
jurisprudence.
28. See State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
29. Again, this would seem to be a La. Code Evid. art. 104(A) pre-trial determination which
would be accomplished at the Prieur hearing.
30. La. Code Crim. P. art. 770 provides in part:
Upon motion of a defendant, a mistrial shall be ordered when a remark or comment,
made within the hearing of the jury by the judge, district attorney, or a court official,
during the trial or in argument, refers directly or indirectly to:
(2) Another crime committed or alleged to have been committed by the defendant as to
which evidence is not admissible
An admonition to the jury to disregard the remark or comment shall not be sufficient
to prevent a mistrial. If the defendant, however, requests that only an admonition be
given, the court shall admonish the jury to disregard the remark or comment but shall not
declare a mistrial.
31. For a case in which the doctrine of harmless error is applied, see State v. Romero, 574 So.
2d 330, 335 (La. 1990). Evidence of 52 other crimes of medicaid fraud was admitted against a
defendant charged with 100 counts total. The supreme court applied harmless error analysis,
concluding there was no "reasonable possibility that the evidence might have contributed to the
verdict." The harmless error doctrine is also applied in State v. Abercrombie, 375 So. 2d 1170, 1176
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In summary, the procedural safeguards provide (1) that there be a pre-trial
(pre-introduction) determination by clear and convincing evidence that the act was
committed and that the defendant committed the act; (2) that the defense be given
adequate advance notice of the State's intent to introduce evidence of other specific
bad acts; (3) that those acts to be introduced be described with some particularity;
(4) that the evidence to be introduced "fits" within one of the enumerated
exceptions listed in Article404(B) or otherwise has independent relevance; and (5)
that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact upon the

defendant's right to a fair trial. With these procedural issues concluded, an
examination of the individual exceptions of intent, knowledge, design, and motive

can begin.32

(La. 1979), cert. denied,446 U.S. 935, 100 S. Ct. 2151 (1980). Inadmissible other crimes evidence
was introduced. The court applied harmless error analysis in this fashion: the offense "was not of
a nature that would inflame a jury to the point that it would be influenced to convict a defendant of
first degree murder." See also State v. Kahey, 436 So. 2d 475 (La. 1983); State v. Vernon, 385 So.
2d 200 (La. 1980); State v. Wisinger, 618 So. 2d 923, 927 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 625 So.
2d 1063 (1993). In State v. DeRoche, 629 So. 2d 1267, 1273 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993), the court
said: "ITihe proper standard [of review] to be used is whether there is a reasonable possibility that
the evidence might have contributed to the verdict, and whether the reviewing court is prepared to
state beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not."
Justice Dennis, in State v. Burnette, 353 So. 2d 989. 993-94 (La. 1977), provides powerful
reasoning why harmless error analysis in these kinds of cases is improper:
The State argues that its groundless accusations in the presence of the jury that the
defendants had made attempts on the lives of prosecution witnesses should be disregarded
as "harmless error." In considering such an argument we are bound by the legislative
intention of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 921 ....
Although this law
is expressed in the negative, it clearly imposes an affirmative obligation upon this Court
to reverse a conviction whenever it appears that the error complained of has probably
resulted in a miscarriage of justice, is prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused,
or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right. Since the
defendants were deprived of a mistrial which the legislature has expressly stated "shall be
ordered," there undoubtedly was a substantial violation of a statutory right....
The State's brief, nevertheless, seemingly urges us to weigh the evidence and affirm the
convictions because the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of conviction. But our
constitution prohibits this Court from deciding the factual question of guilt or innocence
and restricts our scope of review to questions of law in criminal cases. Thus it would be
a violation of the constitution and our oaths to weigh the evidence or decide upon the
question of guilt or innocence or to disregard reversible error of law.
(citations omitted).
32. It should be noted although courts and, most especially, prosecutors tend to group these
distinct exceptions into a singularity, they are tjuite different, based on differing and, indeed, often
conflicting, rationales. See State v. Code, 627 So. 2d 1373, 1382 (La, 1993), for an extreme example
of this. The State, in its Prieurnotice to the defense, said its intent was to use other crimes evidence
for the purpose of showing "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and
absence of mistake or accident." It seems rather doubtful that each of these exceptions could
conceivably be a material issue in the same trial. See also State v. DeRoche, 629 So. 2d 1267, 127071, (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993), in which the court, later finding that the contested evidence was
admissible, had no problem with such broad and conflicting rationales advanced by the prosecution
at the Prieurhearing:
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IV. INTENT
Because there is confusion between the general evidentiary problem of
establishing a defendant's intent with the rationale of this exception, this section
begins with a brief discussion of the former before delving into the latter.
All criminal acts are thought to possess some form of mens rea or culpable
intent.33 The general rule is, for the act to have criminal consequences, the
actor must have held the requisite criminal intent at the time of the act.
Generally, there are two levels of culpable intent. While these different
levels are expressed differently depending upon the jurisdiction, Louisiana's
approach to dividing intent into general and specific criminal intent is one to
which other states adhere.3' Specific intent is a higher degree of culpable
intent, requiring the state establish this as an independent element of the crime.
General intent is established by the act itself. For example, in a prosecution for
simple battery, a general intent crime, the prosecution must only establish that
the defendant intended to hit (batter) the victim.3' Conversely, in a case of
second degree battery, a specific intent crime, the prosecution must not only
prove that the defendant battered the victim, but also that she had the intent to
commit serious bodily harm. 36 Thus, in specific intent cases, both the act and
the state of mind are essential elements of the crime. In general intent crimes,

The defendant argues that the state never identified for which purposes under C.E. 404(B)
they intended to introduce the other crimes evidence. However, at the hearing, the state
said, quoting from art. 404(B), that it intended to introduce the evidence to show proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake
or accident, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the transaction
that is the subject of the present proceedings.
A mere recitation of La. Code Evid. art. 404(B) should be insufficient for a trial court to find the
contested evidence is admissible. Prieur, incorporated in La. Code Evid. art. 1103, requires the
prosecutor at the Prieur hearing to state with particularity the exception it relies upon for
admissibility. Prieur, 277 So. 2d at 130. Merely reciting a laundry list of often conflicting rationales
for admissibility should satisfy neither a trial judge nor an appellate judge that the prosecution has

fulfilled his mandated responsibilities.
33. In this sense, culpable intent is used with the meaning that, without this state of mind, the
proscribed act does not have criminal consequences.
34. La. R.S. 14:10 (1987) provides:
Criminal intent may be specific or general:
(1) Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances
indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow
his act or failure to act.
(2) General criminal intent is present whenever there is specific intent, and also when
the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience,
must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result
from his act or failure to act.
35. See La. R.S. 14:35 (1987).
36. See La. R.S. 14:34.1 (1987).
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the act establishes the state of mind, relieving the prosecution from having to
prove a culpable state of mind. 7
Ordinarily, proof of intent at the time of the criminal act is established
through circumstantial evidence. Unless the defendant is willing to get on the
witness stand and testify, not only that she did the proscribed act, but also that
she intended the criminal consequences of that act (as in the television world of
Perry Mason), then intent must be established through the introduction of other
evidence.
If establishing a defendant's intent as noted above was the purpose of Article
404(B), then evidence of specific bad acts of a defendant would be admissible
in every case in which intent was an essential element of the crime charged.
However, the accepted rationale for the exception of intent in Article 404(B) is
otherwise, as illustrated by the following passage:
[I]f A while hunting with B hears the bullet from B's gun whistling past
his head, he is willing to accept B's bad aim or B's accidental tripping
as a conceivable explanation; but if shortly afterwards the same thing
happens again, and if on the third occasion A receives B's bullet in his
body, the immediate inference ... is that B shot at A deliberately;
because the chances of an inadvertent shooting on three successive
similar occasions are extremely small; or ... because inadvertence or
accident is only an abnormal or occasional explanation for the discharge
of a gun at a given object, and therefore the recurrence of a similar
result ... excludes the fair possibility of such an abnormal cause and
points out the cause as probably a more natural and usual one, i.e., a
deliberate discharge at A. In short, similar results do not usually occur
through abnormal causes; and the recurrence of a similar result ...
tends ... to negative accident or inadvertence or self-defense or good
faith or other innocent mental state, and tends to establish ... the
presence of the normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act;
and the force of each additional instance will vary in each kind of
offense according to the probability that the act could be repeated,
within a limited time and under given circumstances, with an innocent
intent.3"
As can be seen, it is the similarity of the past act to the act under evaluation
which gives rise to the inference of criminal intent. The greater the similarity,

37. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 338 So. 2d 690 (La. 1976). In a prosecution for distribution of
methamphetamine under La. R.S. 40:968 (1992), the court, finding evidence of another drug sale was
not admissible to establish intent, stated: "R.S. 40:968 only requires that the prohibited acts be
'knowingly or intentionally' done and thereby only requires a general criminal intent. Since this
intent is established by mere proof of voluntary distribution, intent was not an issue in the case."
Id at 692 (footnote omitted).
38. 2 John H. Wigmore. Evidence § 302, at 241 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
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the more likely the same state of mind is held by the actor in performing both
acts.39 This is Wigmore's "Doctrine of Chances." 40
Further, it is critical to understand that "the act itself is assumed to be
done,--either because (as usually) it is conceded, or because the jury is
instructed not to consider the evidence from this point of view until they
find the
4
act to have been done and are proceeding to determine the intent.", 1
Thus this rule applies to situations where the defendant has admitted the act
but has denied she acted wrongfully; i.e., she did not intend the criminal
consequences of her act. A classic example is when the defendant is charged
with rape. If the defendant admits the act, but asserts the act was voluntary, then
evidence of prior rapes against the same person would tend to negate that
assertion of an innocent state of mind. In this case, the defendant has "placed
intent '2at issue," making this element a "real and genuine contested issue at
trial.
The following cases will illustrate the confusion in determining whether
intent is a "genuine issue" at trial, so evidence of previous bad acts of the
43
accused can be admitted to establish the defendant's intent in the instant case.
In some cases, the court correctly isolates the issue; in others, the court does not.

39. It is conceivable that an act could have been innocently done once, but where
defendant isproved to have committed other similar acts, the likelihood of innocent intent
is considerably diminished. For evidence of another crime to be admissible, it is generally
held that it must have been similar to the crime in question. Although intent is a material
fact, where the requisite intent is an inescapable conclusion from the act, it is uniformly
held that other crimes evidence isinadmissible. However, ifdefendant's evidence disputes
the element of intent, the state may use the other crimes evidence in rebuttal.
Pugh, supra note 2, at 34.
40. Wigmore, supra note 38, § 302, at 241.
41. Id. at 245.
42. State v. Shaheen, 440 So. 2d 999, 1000 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 443 So. 2d 586
(1983). The defendant was convicted of selling obscene materials. The evidence at issue was four
earlier convictions for selling obscene movies and books. The court stated:
The defendant has not alleged that he was unaware of the nature of the magazine or that
he did not possess "guilty knowledge" which is an essential element of obscenity. It is
possible during trial the defendant may raise certain defenses, whereby "intent" would
become a contested issue. The defendant's plea of not guilty, without more, however,
does not make "intent" a real and genuine contested issue.
Id.at 1000 (footnote omitted).
43. Since the Louisiana Code of Evidence was adopted in 1988, some of these cases were
decided under previous law, notably La. R.S. 15:445 and 446 (repealed 1989):
§ 445. Inference of intent; evidence of acts similar to that charged.
In order to show intent, evidence is admissible of similar acts, independent of the act
charged as a crime in the indictment, for though intent is a question of fact, it need not
be proven as a fact, it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction.
§ 446. Evidence where knowledge or intent is material and where offense is one of
system.
When knowledge or intent forms an essential part of the inquiry, testimony may be
offered of such acts, conduct or declarations of the defendant as tend to establish such
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In State v. Germain," the defendant was accused of manslaughter. The
victim was the three-year-old daughter of his wife. Physical examination of the
child "revealed that the child had bruises of all colors over her entire body."45
The pathologist testified that the child "was bruised over her entire body... that
the cause of death was 'an acute subdural hemorrhage[,]"' and that there were
so many bruises on the child's brain that they were "'too many to count. '
The wife waived her privilege and testified against her husband that her
husband would get drunk and beat the child, and the day before the child died,
the defendant had hit the child in the stomach, causing her to fall and strike her
head. When, the next day, the child could not be kept awake, the defendant and
his wife took the child to the hospital-where the child subsequently died."'
The husband's defense was that it was the wife who beat the child, although
he did admit to disciplining the child. Further, the husband said he had no intent
of harming the child when he did discipline her.48
The issue in this case was the admissibility of the other bad acts of the.husband
in beating the child to which the wife testified. The court, in answering this
question, articulated a test which is now the accepted test in this jurisdiction:
Generally, evidence of other acts of misconduct is not admissible;
however, there are statutory and jurisprudential exceptions to this
exclusionary rule, when the evidence of other acts tends to prove a
material issue and has independent relevance other than showing that the
defendant is a man of bad character. Even if independently relevant, the
probative value of such evidence must be weighed against its prejudicial
effect.49
In resolving that the wife's testimony of the husband's other bad acts had
independent relevance and was admissible, the court stated:

knowledge or intent and where the offense is one of a system, evidence is admissible to
prove the continuity of the offense, and the commission of similar offenses for the
purpose of showing guilty knowledge and intent, but not to prove the offense charged.
See generally William A. Jones, Jr., Comment, Other Crimes Evidence in Louisiana-To Show
Knowledge, Intent, System, Etc., in the Case in Chief, 33 La. L. Rev. 614 (1973).

For other cases in which the defendant claimed innocent intent, see State v. Talbert, 416 So. 2d
97 (La. 1982). Defendant allegedly raped the victim approximately one month earlier. In the present
prosecution, the defendant claimed that the act was consensual. The prior act was allowed to
establish lack of innocent intent. l at 100. In State v. Smith, 513 So. 2d 438 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1987), the defendant, charged with armed robbery, claimed he had no idea his partner had the intent
to rob the store. Evidence of a similar armed robbery in which the defendant participated was
allowed. lId at 443.
44. 433 So. 2d 110 (La. 1983).
45. Id at 112.
46. Id at 113.
47.

Id.

48.
49.

Id. at 113-14.
Id. at 117 (citations omitted).
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Defendant asserted as his defense that he hit the child to discipline her, but
that he never intended to harm her. By this assertion of innocence, or lack
of intent, defendant directly put the question of his having the requisite
criminal intent for the commission of the crime at issue.5°
State v. Driggers3 ' involved allegations that the defendant engaged in
indecent behavior with his six-year-old granddaughter. The testimony at issue was
of six other witnesses who alleged the defendant engaged in similar acts with them
in the past.
The evidence included: (1) Testimony by the defendant's niece that
approximately eighteen years earlier the defendant "grabbed her hand and put it in
his overalls to make her touch his penis.... [He] exposed his penis and asked her
to kiss it.... [He] fondled her and inserted his finger into her vagina.... [He]
rubbed her. . . almost every time she visited." 52 (2) Testimony by a former nextdoor neighbor that twenty-six years earlier, when the witness was nine, the
defendant "put his hand in her underwear and fondled her vagina."" (3) Testimony by a former next-door neighbor that fifteen years earlier, when the witness was
nine, on two occasions the defendant "looked at pornographic magazines while he
fondled her and masturbated."5' On another occasion, he "pulled her clothes
down and rubbed his penis on her."55 Finally, he once "made her rub his penis
with her hand."- (4) Testimony by a friend of the defendant's daughter that seven
or eight years earlier, when the witness was twelve or thirteen, the defendant once
"put his hand into her underwear to fondle her vagina., 57 On other occasions, the
'
defendant "took her pants off to fondle her vagina and... fondled her breasts." "
(5) Testimony by a former neighbor that twenty-four to twenty-six years earlier,
when the witness was ten or twelve, the defendant attempted to molest her but
failed when she "ran out the back door." 59 (6) Testimony by the defendant's
sister-in-law that twenty years earlier, the witness' daughter, who was then twelve,
told her "that the defendant had put his hands down her pants to touch her
vagina." 6
The state argued that defendant put intent at issue by claiming "that the
-offenses with which he is charged occurred with innocent intent
or were inadver6
tent, accidental, unintentional, or without guilty knowledge." '

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 118.
554 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
id. at 722.
Id
Id
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id. at 723.

60.

Id.

61.

Id. at 722. It is important to note the defense, on appeal, contended "that intent is not at
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The court allowed the testimony to be admitted to establish the intent of the
defendant, stating:
Given that defendant claimed that the acts were unintentional or
accidental, material issues in the instant case will be defendant's specific
intent to commit indecent behavior with his granddaughter and his general
criminal intent to commit the offense of oral sexual battery....
Intent may be proved by evidence of acts or conduct that tends to
establish the fact of intent. If the defendant has committed similar
criminal activity in the past, this shows a willfulness on his part to commit
these same crimes today, thereby reducing the possibility that the crime
in question was committed through ignorance, was unintentional, or was
with innocent intent or without guilty knowledge. 62
These two cases, with the reservations noted, are ones in which the court
properly applied the rationale of the exception. The defendant claimed an innocent
intent, allowing the prosecution to introduce the evidence to rebut that assertion.
The following cases, on the other hand, illustrate examples of the improper use of
other crimes evidence to establish propensity in the guise of establishing intent.
In State v. Thompson,63 the defendant was charged with manslaughter. The
victim was his girlfriend. The testimony at issue was that of the victim's friend that
the defendant had, at a neighborhood bar two days before the shooting, "pulled a
black gun from his pants, pointed it at Lisa's face and told her, 'You didn't get me
no beer."' ' The victim's friend further testified that the defendant "held the gun
to Lisa's face for about fifteen minutes while they were walking down the street
and during the incident Lisa seemed afraid."'6
The defendant, while telling several conflicting stories, essentially claimed his
girlfriend had shot herself, either accidentally or purposefully. Thus, this is not a
case where the act was admitted, as in Germain;rather, this is a case where the
defendant claimed he did not do the act. Nonetheless, the supreme court held this
testimony was admissible as tending to establish the intent of the defendant.6

issue because he does not claim that the alleged conduct was accidental, only that it never occurred."
ld. at 725. However, the court answered this by apparently accepting the state's argument that the
"defendant's argument is disingenuous in light of a statement which he made during the investigation
of the matter that suggests that the conduct in question may have occurred inadvertently." Id. The
court's reliance on the prosecution's assertion that the defendant had made an out-of-court statement
which impacted on the defendant's intent, rather than the defendant's assertion at trial that the acts
never happened, is extremely suspect. However, if the court is granted its premise, its reasoning
seems correct.
62. Id. at 724-25 (citation omitted).
63. 532 So. 2d 1160 (La. 1988).
64. Id. at 1163.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1164.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

The court reasoned that, since the State did not specify in the bill of particulars
which section of Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:31 was at issue, the applicable
provision was Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:31 (2)(a), which includes "a homicide
committed, without any intent to cause death or great bodily harm... [w]hen the
offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration ofany felony not
enumerated in Articles
30 or 30.1, or of any intentional misdemeanor directly
67
affecting the person."

Finding the State was required to prove the element of intent, the court stated:
"Defendant's defense was that Lisa shot herself either accidentally or intentionally.
By this assertion, defendant placed intent directly at
issue. The evidence of the
'6
prior assault was... relevant to rebut this defense. s
The court seems to be saying: (1) if a statute has intent as an element of a
crime; (2) and the defendant denies that she has committed the act; (3) then the
defendant has placed intent "at issue;" (4) thus making admissible evidence ofother
bad acts of the defendant to establish her intent in the instant case to rebut the
unasserted defense. If the court's statement is taken at face value, then the court
appears to have forgotten the rationale behind the rule.
The defendant in this case did not put intent at issue. The defendant put
identity at issue. He did not assert, "Idid the act, but I did it without
criminal
'69
intent." Instead, he asserted, "Idid not do the act; someone else did.

67. La. R.S. 14:31 (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
68. State v. Thompson, 532 So. 2d 1160. 1164 (La. 1988). In a similar, but highly contrasting,
vein, see State v. Humphrey, 412 So. 2d 507 (La. 1981). The defendant was convicted of two counts
of manslaughter in the deaths of his two infant children. On original hearing, the court held
testimony by his common-law wife that, three days prior to the deaths, the defendant had slapped and
beaten both children, to be admissible to establish the intent of the defendant. The defendant's
defense, however, was not innocent intent, rather, it was that he did not kill the children. On
rehearing, the court recognized this:
In the present case, there was no real issue of whether defendant acted with general
criminal intent, since there is no suggestion that the person who committed the battery
resulting in the homicide did not clearly intend to use force or violence upon the person
of the children. Manslaughter, as charged here, is an unintended killing resulting from
a battery. The truly crucial issue in this case was the identity of the person who beat the
children to death, and the entire defense was oriented toward the contention that this
defendant did not commit the crime. There is no contention that although his beating
killed them, his use of force against the children either was accidental or was the
reasonable, privileged use of force to discipline minors.
Id. at 521 (citation omitted). The court admitted the evidence-but to establish identity rather than
intent. See also State v. Welch, 615 So. 2d 300, 302 (La. 1993):
[In this case, intent did not become an actively disputed issue at trial. Welch did not
claim that he accidentally struck the victim, or that he had not intended to inflict serious
harm. Rather, he denied the attack altogether. In this regard... absent an active dispute
over the issue of intent, the Fourth Circuit's rationale for admitting the evidence
sanctioned the introduction of such evidence for its prohibited use of demonstrating the
defendant's prior violent character, to show that he acted "in conformity therewith," which
is not allowed.
69. While there may be an argument that this evidence should be admissible to establish
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State v. Jackson"° is the supreme court's latest pronouncement of the standard
when attempting to introduce prior bad acts by the defendant to establish intent at
the time of the charged act. It is a troubling case, incorporating the worst of the
reasonings in both Driggersand Thompson.
In this case, strikingly similar factually to Driggers,the defendant was charged
with three counts of molesting a juvenile. The victims were his granddaughters,
aged ten and seven at the time of the alleged crimes. The evidence at issue was
testimony by his three daughters that the defendant had previously molested them.
At the Prieurhearing,7 the State introduced the following evidence: (1) The first
daughter's testimony that twenty-four years earlier, when the witness was twelve,
her father would "kiss her, feel her and then 'stick his penis in' her."72 (2) The
second daughter's testimony that on at least two occasions, twenty-one to twentytwo years earlier, when the witness was eleven or twelve, her father "kissed her and
touched her privates, including her breasts."" (3) The third daughter's testimony
that, from fifteen to twenty-two years earlier, when the witness was between the
ages of eight and fifteen, her father "would kiss her all over, hold her tight, fondle
her and expose himself to her."7 4
In resolving whether this evidence should have been allowed at trial, using
reasoning reminiscent of Thompson, the court stated:
The state believes the testimony of the defendant's daughters shows he
took advantage of one-on-one situations with immediate family female
juveniles and was motivated by an unnitural interest in adolescent/prepubescent females. In order to obtain a conviction, the state will have to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements required for the crime
of molestation of ajuvenile. One of those elements is that defendant had
the intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of either himself
or the victims. In other words, the state will have to prove specific intent.
This court has recognized the principle that where the element of intent
is regarded as an essential ingredient of the crime charged, it is proper to
admit proof of similar but disconnected crimes to show the intent with
which the act charged was committed.""

identity, this exception is ordinarily used for so-called "signature" crimes, of which this is not one.
See McCormick, supra note 2. § 190, at 801-03.
70. 625 So. 2d 146 (La. 1993).
71. See supra note 27.
72. Jackson, 625 So. 2d at 148.
73. U
74. 1d
75. Id at 149-50 (quoting State v. Cupit, 189 La. 509, 515, 179 So. 837. 839 (1938)). In the
federal system, the Supreme Court recently addressed this question in Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct.
475 (1991), and came to a similar conclusion. In Estelle, the defendant had been found guilty in a
California state court of the second degree murder of his infant daughter and sought habeas corpus
relief. One issue was the introduction of expert testimony to establish battered child syndrome, which
was allowable under California law. The federal court of appeals held that this evidence was
inadmissible. Reversing this ruling, the Court stated:
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Unlike Driggers,the court did not find any out-of-court statement by the
defendant which could be used to establish that the defendant had, in fact, put intent
at issue. Further, the court, unlike Thompson, acknowledged the defendant had not
made intent an issue by simply denying the act. Addressing this, the court stated:
"Therefore, in this case, the evidence of other crimes committed by defendant will
be useful in proving that the defendant did not act innocently, and will negate any
''6
defense that he acted without intent or that the acts were accidental.
This is quite unfortunate language. First, in almost every crime, intent is an
essential ingredient of the crime charged. Second, the court held the admission of
this evidence is allowable not only to rebut a defense of innocent intent, but to
admit the evidence so as to negate the possibility of the defense. The first is the
questionable reasoning which the court employed in Thompson. The second is new
for this jurisdiction, and is a major shift towards allowing the admission of this
evidence-even when the defense of innocent intent or accident is not asserted by
the defendant.
If this is the state of the law in admitting past bad acts of the defendant to
establish intent, then there will be few instances when a similar past act of the
defendant would not be admissible." The evidence would be admissible whether
the defendant claimed innocent intent or accident or merely alleged, as in Jackson,
that she did not do the act in question. The problems with this reasoning were well
expressed by the dissent in State v. Bolden,7" in which evidence of a rape
occurring two years earlier against a different victim was admitted to establish the
intent of the defendant at the time of the alleged rape for which he was charged:
This decision may well have substituted for trial of the offense
charged a trial of the defendant's predisposition and propensity for
committing such an offense based on his past record of conduct. Under
the possibilities presented by this holding, that sometimes gossamer cloak
of innocence with which we clothe a defendant is totally ripped aside, and
a defendant will now be enshrouded with the sackcloth of presumption of

This ruling ignores the fact that the prosecution must prove all the elements of a criminal
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In this second degree murder case, for example, the
prosecution was required to demonstrate that the killing was intentional. By eliminating
the possibility of accident, the evidence regarding battered child syndrome was clearly
probative of that essential element, especially in light of the fact that.., prior to trial (the
defendant allegedl that Tori had injured herself by falling from the couch.... [T]he
prosecution's burden to prove every element of the crime is not relieved by a defendant's
tactical decision not to contest an essential element of the offense.
14 at 481 (citation omitted).
76. State v. Jackson, 625 So. 2d 146, 150 (La. 1993). Compare State v. Martin, 377 So. 2d
259, 263 (La. 1979): "The mere theory that a plea of not guilty puts everything material at issue is
not enough .... The prosecution cannot credit the accused with fancy defenses in order to rebut
them at the outset with some damning piece of evidence."
77. See, e.g., State v. Bourque, 622 So. 2d 198 (La. 1993); State v. Fink, 601 So. 2d 694 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1992).
78. 257 La. 60, 241 So. 2d 490 (1970).
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guilt founded on past unsavory conduct. And since trial is no longer
limited to the offense charged but is now open for the presentment of the
entire panorama of a defendant's past life, how will he prepare his
defense?79
This reasoning, however, might be limited to analogous situations, i.e.,
allegations of child abuse where other victims belatedly come forth, especially
when "the defendant is well acquainted with the persons accusing him of other
crimes ... [so as to] be in a position to point out credibility problems and/or ulterior
motives.... [The defendant] will also be better able to explain his alleged actions
than if the accuser were a stranger or even a third party known to him."8W
V.

KNOWLEDGE

This exception is more prbperly termed "guilty knowledge," 8' as this is the
relevant inquiry. 2 This exception applies when the question is: Did the defendant
know at the time of the offense that the act she was committing had criminal
consequences? 3

79. Id. at 66-67, 241 So. 2d at 492 (Barham, J., dissenting). One author puts it this way:
We observe in our passages through life that people are known by the friends they make
and the company they keep. Similarly, we learn that a man's reputation precedes him.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Bible informs us that "our sins testify against us ... "
Thus, our deeds and misdeeds form markers of different phases of our lives, and will
follow us wherever our different paths may lead us, including to, and on occasion into,
the courtroom. But if our sins are to testify against us, what impact will this have upon
the presumption of innocence? Put another way, can the presumption stand for something
more than an empty phrase before the onslaught of the collective misdeeds of our past?
Mascolo, supra note 9, at 1-2.
80. Jackson, 625 So. 2d at 152. See also infra part VIII.
81. See, e.g., State v. Silguero, 608 So. 2d 627 (La. 1992).
82. Guilty knowledge should be distinguished from consciousness of guilt. See State v.
Burnette, 353 So. 2d 989 (La. 1977). The defendants were convicted of aggravated kidnapping. The
State's theory was that the defendants, Burnette and Granger, suspected that two other persons,
Johnson and Mulvey, had been hired to kill them. Thinking so, the defendants lured the victims
away from a lounge to a remote spot where Mulvey was killed. Johnson was taken to Mississippi
and killed. This case only dealt with the kidnapping aspect of these crimes.
The other crimes evidence at issue was the prosecutor's references, made during his opening
statement, to the firing upon of a trailer of one of the State's witnessess and to the defendant,
Burnette, coming from Texas into Louisiana with the purpose of killing another of the State's
witnesses.
The court indicated the evidence of these two crimes would be admissible to establish that the
defendant knew himself to be guilty of the crimes with which he had been charged. However, since
the prosecution made no attempt to connect the defendant to the uncharged crimes, the evidence was
ruled inadmissible. Id. at 993.
83. Knowledge signifies an awareness of a fact. In some crimes, it may be an element of
the crime. For example, a prosecution for receiving stolen property requires that defendant
know the property was stolen. Evidence that defendant knowingly bought stolen property
from the same person on a prior occasion is generally admissible. The connection between
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Here, again, the act is established. What is at issue is whether the defendant
knew her act to be criminal.U For example, in the case where a person is caught
red-handed in possession of stolen goods, the only defense is the defendant did not
know the goods in her possession were stolen. Without this knowledge, the act is
not criminal."
In such a case, use of similar examples of the defendant's possession of stolen
goods in which her guilty knowledge has been established would tend to prove that,
in this case, the defendant also possessed guilty knowledge." As in the case of
intent, Wigmore's "Doctrine of Chances" dictates that the greater the similarity
between the uncharged and the charged acts, the greater the relevance and probity
of the uncharged act.
In State v. Silguero,s7 the defendant was caught red-handed with his own
suitcase filled with marijuana. He claimed his friend "gained access to the suitcases
by making an unauthorized duplicate set of keys to defendant's storage unit."88
He denied knowledge that the suitcases contained marijuana until the bags had
already been transported within the state to Lafayette, whereupon he confronted his
friend and found out the contents.
At issue was the prosecution's question to the defendant on cross-examination:
"Do you know if those-the marijuana that was found in these suitcases was part
of the same marijuana that was found in your storage building?"8 9
Resolving this issue, the court explained:
Defendant, on direct-examination, sought to establish as a defense a
lack of knowledge of the contents of the suitcases by providing an
innocent explanation of how his suitcases had been removed from his
storage unit and filled with marijuana without his knowledge. This
defense directly placed his "guilty knowledge" at issue and made evidence

transactions (same thief, similar circumstances) renders more probable the fact that
defendant was aware of the nature of the property at the later transaction.
Pugh, supra note 2, at 33.
84. Knowledge signifies a being aware; and in the usual case of the present sort this
knowledge refers to the nature of a thing used in the alleged crime. Even where the doing
of the act involved is not disputed, a knowledge existing at the time of the act may be in
dispute. Thus, proof of knowledge becomes a usual necessity for certain offenses, such as
the uttering of forged or counterfeit paper and the possession of stolen goods; while it is
rarely an element to be proved in other offenses, such as robbery, rape, and homicide.
Wigmore. supra note 38, § 300, at 237 (citation omitted).
85. In Louisiana, La. R.S. 14:69(A) (1986) provides:
Illegal possession of stolen things is the intentional possessing, procuring, receiving, or
concealing of anything of value which has been the subject of any robbery or theft, under
circumstances which indicate that the offender knew or had good reason to believe that
the thing was the subject of one of these offenses.
86. In the federal arena, see Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S. Ct. 1496 (1988),
discussed more fully supra text accompanying note 25.
87. 608 So. 2d 627 (La. 1992).
88. Id. at 628.
89. Id. at 629.
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of other crimes relevant to rebut that issue.... The state's evidence that
less than two weeks after the purported commission of the charged offense
defendant's storage unit contained not simply business supplies, but
almost four times the marijuana transported to Louisiana directly
challenged defendant's exculpatory account of events. 90
In State v. Martin,9' the defendant was convicted as a principal to forgery.
He was charged with forgery by the false making of a signature to a check which
he knowingly issued to Woolco Department Store with the intent to defraud. This
was accomplished by having his concubine forge the signature, posing as the true
account holder.92 The state tried to establish through the testimony of the
defendant's concubine that the defendant had forced her to commit the forgery by
threatening to blow her head off, shoot her in all her joints so she would never be
able to use her arms or legs again, cut her nose off, and leave her to bleed to death.
She further testified to the defendant's involvement in the purchase and distribution
of unlawful drugs.93 The purpose of this testimony was to establish the "coercion
intrinsic to the couple's relationship." 94
In holding this evidence was not properly admissible, the court stated:
The uncontroverted testimony of the state's witnesses is to the effect
that Martin stole the check and driver's license used in the forgery,
instructed Womack as how to perpetrate the crime, accompanied her to the
store, approved her selection of the stereo, drove her and the stereo to his
trailer, and retained possession of the fruits of the crime. The requisite
knowledge and intent to make Martin a principal to the forgery were fully
established by this uncontradicted evidence.
Thus, in the absence of a defense that Womack committed the forgery
without Martin's knowledge and assistance, "intent" or "knowledge" were
not genuine matters at issue. Defendant's plea of not guilty, without
more, did not make evidence of extraneous offenses admissible to prove
"intent" or "guilty knowledge." The evidence must indicate that these are
real and genuine matters at issue, independent of the defendant's general
claim of innocence posed by his plea of not guilty, to permit the exceptionally allowed evidence of extraneous offenses and wrongful acts. The
mere theory that a plea of not guilty puts everything material at issue is
not enough for this purpose. The prosecution cannot credit the accused

90. Id at 630. This case demonstrates thai evidence ofother crimes or acts need not be of acts
committed in the past in order to be independently relevant.
91. 377 So. 2d 259 (La. 1979) (on rehearing).
92. The defendant had broken into the account holder's car and stolen her purse which
contained the account holder's driver's license. This identification was used to successfully pull off
the forgery. Id at 262. Defendant's concubine pleaded guilty prior to the prosecution of the instant
case.
93.

Id.

94.

Id
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with fancy defenses in order to rebut them at the outset with some
damning piece of evidence. 95
These two cases show the proper analysis to be used when other crimes
evidence is sought to be introduced to establish the defendant's guilty knowledge.
However, as noted earlier, these exceptions are often mixed up with intent, system,
motive, and other exceptions. When the issue is properly isolated as in the cases
above, the court seems to have a proper understanding of the correct analysis.9
Note that these are relatively "easy" cases, i.e., a small-time forger in Martin and
a low-level drug dealer in Silguero. In these types of cases, there is a greater
likelihood the courts will intellectually analyze the independent relevance of the
contested evidence and a correspondingly high likelihood the courts will come, by
traditional analysis, to a correct conclusion. Contrawise, in cases such as Driggers
andJackson, there is an equally high likelihood a court will fail to scrutinize the
evidence in terms of its independent relevance and a correspondingly high degree V"
of likelihood the court will, by traditional analysis, come to the incorrect
conclusion.
VI. PLAN

For this exception to be applicable, it is not necessary for the defendant to have
admitted to the criminal act as in the case of knowledge or intent. In fact, it would
be a rare case where the act is conceded by the defendant that this exception would
be applicable. 97 Also, unlike the underlying rationale for intent and knowledge,
design or plan is not an essential part of the criminal act in most instances.98
Rather, the rationale for this exception is to allow the prosecution to establish in the
jury's mind an understanding of the crime itself. And, in contrast to knowledge and
intent, there is no necessity that any similarity exists between the uncharged and the
charged crime.
The rationale for this exception is illustrated by the following:
If, for example, it could be shown that a defendant had formed a settled
purpose to obtain certain property, which could only be got by doing
several preliminary things, the last of which in the order of time was
criminal, the government might show, on his trial for the commission of
that last, criminal act, that he had formed the purpose to accomplish the

95. Id. at 263 (citations omitted).
96. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 338 So. 2d 690 (La. 1976); State v. Slayton, 338 So. 2d 694 (La.
1976).
97. See Wigmore, supra note 38, § 301, at 238: "Design or plan ... is the preceding mental
condition which evidentially points forward to the doing of the act designed or planned. Thus, the
peculiarity of design is that the act is not assumed to be proved, and the design is used evidentially
to show its probable commission." (citations omitted).
98. Pugh, supra note 2, at 32.
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result of obtaining the property, and that he had done all of the preliminary
things which were necessary to that end.99
Thus, the reason for this exception is to allow evidence of "the existence of a
larger plan, scheme, or conspiracy, of which the crime on trial is a part. Each crime
should be an integral part of an overarching plan explicitly conceived and executed
'
by the defendant or his confederates."'O
In State v. Mayer,'' the defendant was convicted of second degree murder
of his wife. The evidence at issue was that the defendant had, four days earlier,
entered the home of the wife's sister with a gun. While there, he held her at
gunpoint and forced the sister to tell the defendant information on his wife's
"whereabouts and daily activities. '""°2
The prosecution's theory was that the defendant, upon leaving the courthouse
"after a hearing in domestic court, obtained a gun, returned to the court, waited for
and followed his wife to an intersection near her home, whereupon he intentionally
murdered her."'0 3
The court ruled evidence of the earlier crime against the victim's sister was
properly introduced to establish a plan which culminated in the murder of the
1°4
victim.
As has been remarked earlier, the prosecution frequently throws the whole of
the exceptions listed in Article 404(B) at the court in a barely disguised effort to get
the evidence of other crimes before a jury by whatever means available. The
prosecution knows this evidence is highly prejudicial and will go a long way
towards convicting a defendant.'°5
In Jackson, the court, quoting from Driggers, discussed the evidence in
connection with the possibility that it fit within the system or plan exception:
"[T]he continuity and consistency with which the other crimes occurred indicate a
pattern of behavior and not merely one or two isolated incidents. 'I" The court
held, as in Driggers,that "the testimony of defendant's three adult daughters that
their father fondled their breasts and kissed them to be admissible to prove ...
107
plan."

99. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 16 N.E. 452, 454-55 (Mass. 1888). Robinson is cited in
Wigmore, supra note 38, § 304, at 250.
100. McCormick, supra note 2, § 190, at 800-01 (footnotes omitted).
101. 589 So. 2d 1145 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991), writ denied, 609 So. 2d 251 (1992).
102. Id at 1150.
103. Id
104. Id
105. "[W]hile the government may be reluctant 'to admit it, the reasons proffered to admit
extrinsic-acts evidence may often be a subterfuge for the real motive behind the use of this type of
evidence, which, at least in part, is an urge to impugn the defendant's character." Mascolo, supra
note 9, at 284.
106. State v. Jackson, 625 So. 2d 146, 151 (La. 1993) (quoting State v. Driggers, 554 So. 2d
720, 727 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989)).
107. Id at 152.
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An attentive reader will recall that the testimony of the niece and neighbors
molested by the defendant in Driggers occurred some seven to twenty-eight years
earlier. And, inJackson, the molestation occurred from fifteen to twenty-four years
prior to the events for which the defendant was on trial. It stretches credibility to
the limit to accept that these two defendants had conceived a plan that included, at
the time of making the plan,the molestation of children who had yet to be born.
Further, to adopt the reasoning in Driggersand Jackson, it must be believed that
these defendants held this plan in their minds for that extraordinary length of time
and, upon the event of the birth of the children and their subsequent aging to the
proper range of their appetites, acted out the plans conceived close to three decades
08
earlier.'
These two cases exemplify the improper analysis to be used when deciding
whether a fact pattern satisfies the requirements of the exception to the admission
of other crimes evidence to prove a defendant's system or design or plan."°
VII. MOTIVE
This exception is less like intent or knowledge and more like plan. Both intent
and knowledge have independent relevance in the case at bar because they are
essential elements of the charged crime. In a prosecution for intentional second
degree murder, the prosecution must establish specific intent; in a prosecution for
receiving stolen goods, the prosecution must establish the defendant's guilty
knowledge. In the case of plan or motive, however, neither is normally an element
of the crime which the prosecution is attempting to establish, rather the prosecution
is trying to create in the jury's mind an understanding of the crime. Unlike
knowledge or intent, and like plan, there is no need for any degree of similarity
between the uncharged and charged acts.
In the case of motive, the issue is the why of the crime. In this case, the
defendant denies she has committed the crime. By the introduction of evidence
which provides a motive, the prosecution is able to establish the defendant was
more likely to have committed the crime than a person without a similar motive.
For example, if the defendant is on trial for murder, and it is discovered that the
victim was blackmailing the defendant for embezzlement, then the presentation of
this other crimes evidence would tend to establish a motive for commission of the
murder.

108. [Tlhe fact that adefendant planned to commit the crime in question, as evidenced by
a plan and action upon it, certainly renders more probable the conclusion that defendant did
commit that crime. If the plan contemplated the commission of another crime, the state's
proof of this plan thus becomes a problem of other crimes evidence. It is generally held
that unless this alleged plan contemplated both the other crime and the act charged in the
indictment, it is inadmissible.
Pugh, supra note 2. at 32-33 (footnotes omitted).
109. See also State v. Hawkins, 633 So. 2d 301 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993); State v. Howard, 520
So. 2d 1150 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987), writ denied, 526 So. 2d 790 (1988).
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As can be seen from the foregoing example, the relationship between the other
act and the crime for which the defendant is charged must be singularly interwoven." 0 A general motive, such as greed or lust, shared by all with similar drives,
is insufficient. For if the motive of greed were sufficient to establish the
independent relevance required by Article 404(B), any time a person is charged
with doing something criminal to acquire a pecuniary gain, then any act in which
he has evinced a similar state of mind would be admissible." So, too, would any
lustful act be admissible against a defendant charged with a sexual crime. There
should be more. There should be some connexity between thisdefendant and this
crime. It should be some motive sufficiently unique that it points unerringly at this
defendant.
In State v. Lee," 2 the defendant was convicted of manslaughter. The
defendant had gone alone on a camping trip with a thirteen-year-old boy. While on
this trip, the prosecution theorized that the defendant attempted to have sexual
contact with the boy, and when rebuffed, shot him with a shotgun. The evidence at
issue was that the defendant had had sex with another male friend.
In refusing to allow the evidence of the defendant's prior homosexual act, the
court stated:

[I]n order to have independent relevance, the motive established by
the other crimes must be more than a general one, such as gaining wealth,
which could be the underlying basis for almost any crime; it must be a
motive factually peculiar to the victim and the charged crime. Evidence
of defendant's homosexuality only establishes a general motive. Without

additional evidence indicating a motive to commit the particular crime
involved in this case, the evidence of homosexuality should not be
admitted to prove motive." 3
In State v. Brown,"14 the defendant was convicted of attempted first degree
murder of a deputy sheriff who stopped the defendant for speeding. The evidence

at issue was the stolen car the defendant was driving. The defendant claimed the
deputy sheriff had been shot by a passenger.

Allowing the evidence of the theft of the car to be admitted, the court stated:
Evidence that defendant had stolen the Thunderbird which he was
operating is admissible as an exception to La.C.Cr.P. art. 770 because it
establishes motive on part of defendant to commit the crime charged.

110. If the defendant had a particular reason to accomplish a crime and the crime was
effected, proof of defendant's motive renders more probable the fact that he was the actor.
In order to have independent relevance, the motive reflected by other crimes should be
factually peculiar to the victim and the crime charged.
Pugh, supra note 2, at 33-34 (footnotes omitted).
111. See, e.g., State v. Sutfield, 354 So. 2d 1334, 1337 (La. 1978).
112. 569 So. 2d 1038 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
113. Id. at 1042 (citations omitted).
114. 398 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1981).
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Motive has been defined as a reason the accused has for committing the
charged offense. Motive is the cause or reason that moves the will and
induces action for definite result.
Defendant, the admitted driver of the Thunderbird, under normal
circumstances would have no reason to have shot at the officer who was
stopping him on a speeding charge, the punishment for which would
probably have only been a fine. Defendant denied shooting the officer.
He testified the officer was shot by Williams. It therefore became
important to the State's case to establish a reason why defendant would
have fired the shot. If defendant had stolen the automobile, a crime for
which he could be sent to prison for many years, it was most important for
him to avoid having the crime discovered, a very likely probability in the
event he was arrested on the speeding charge. Proof that defendant had
stolen the vehicle establishes a motive for defendant to fire upon the
officer in order to avoid being arrested on the speeding charge. "5
The courts in these two cases understand the proper use of motive as an
exception to the general exclusion of character evidence to prove propensity. In
Lee, the court recognizes that a person's particular sexual deviance is an aspect of
character and, like greed to a thief, only implies a general motive shared by all in
like circumstances. There is nothing particular about the defendant's alleged
homosexuality in Lee which provided a nexus with the murder of the victim.
Likewise, in Brown, the court correctly found that the stolen car provided a
particular motive to a particular person for killing the deputy sheriff when the
defendant was stopped for speeding." 6
In State v. Bailey,"7 the defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated oral sexual battery. The alleged victims were his present stepdaughters and his
former stepdaughters. At issue was the introduction of other, uncharged crimes
committed against the same victims and testimony that the defendant had
committed similar acts against other victims who were not members of the
defendant's family.
The second circuit denied writs, relying on State v. Driggersto the effect that
the testimony established the defendant's motive to "engage in such activities with
prepubescent and adolescent girls with whom he is familiar and while he is alone
with them or otherwise not being observed."" 8

115. Id. at 1384 (citation omitted).
116. See also State v. Lafleur, 398 So. 2d 1074 (La. 1981). The defendant was convicted of the
second degree murder of the son of his live-in concubine. The defendant had previously stated he
wanted to "get rid" of the child because of the child's excessive "whining and whimpering." The
contested evidence was the defendant's prior beatings of the child. Id. at 1080. The court held the
evidence was admissible to establish a motive that was "factually peculiar to the victim and the

charged crime ...... ld
117.

588 So. 2d 90 (La. 1991) (per curiam).

118.

State v.Bailey, No. 23-194-KW (La. App. 2d Cir. June 13, 1991). Itshould be noted that
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The supreme court reversed in part the second circuit's writ denial." 9 As to
the testimony of the stepdaughters, the court implied this evidence was admissible
to establish motive. 20 However, the evidence that the defendant had engaged in
somewhat similar activity with other, non-family members while they were of
similar ages, was reversed. The brief per curiam opinion merely stated that such
evidence did not "establish the defendant's particular motive for committing the
charged crime against the prosecutrix... and it otherwise fails to establish a pattern
of committing sexual offenses against the same prosecutrix."''2
By affirming the admission of the testimony of the stepdaughters to establish
the defendant's motive, the supreme court affirmed the reasoning in Driggers,
which is criticized throughout this paper. As to the reversal of the second circuit's
reasoning regarding the non-family members,
the supreme court seems to have
22
repudiated that part of Driggers' reasoning.
In State v. DeRoche, 23 the defendant was convicted of the rape of a juvenile
boy. The evidence at issue was testimony that the defendant had sexually abused
two other juvenile boys. At the Prieurhearing, the state merely quoted the entire
second sentence of Article 404(B) rather than identifying with particularity which
of the enumerated exceptions it was relying upon for the admissibility of the
contested evidence. With this "laundry-list" available, the appellate court found the
evidence was admissible
to prove defendant's motive or plan, i.e., molesting
124
juvenile males.

the second circuit, in its writ denial, stated that none of the evidence would be admissible to establish
the defendant's intent because "specific intent is not an element of the charged offenses and applicant
has not otherwise made intent an issue .... Should, during trial, applicant claim that the acts alleged
in the bill of information occurred through unintentional conduct, then, of course, intent would be
placed at issue." (citation omitted). Therefore, the court relied on Driggers only for the element of
motive-not intent.
119. 588 So. 2d 90 (La. 1991) (per curiam).
120. The supreme court affirmed the second circuit's decision as to this evidence for the reasons
given in the second circuit's writ denial.
121. Bailey, 588 So. 2d at 90.
122. But see State v. Jackson, 625 So. 2d 146 (La. 1993); State v. Jamison, 617 So. 2d 480 (La.
1993) (per curiam). In Jamison, the defendant was charged with the aggravated rape of his
stepdaughter and his daughter, both juveniles. He was acquitted of the charges relating to his
daughter and convicted of those relating to this stepdaughter. At issue was testimony that the
defendant had committed similar acts on two other juvenile, non-family members of the same
approximate age as the victims, around the same time as the acts with which the defendant was
charged. Also at issue was testimony that the defendant had committed similar acts with the alleged
victims.
The third circuit allowed the testimony to be admitted. The supreme court reversed in part. As to
the evidence that the defendant committed similar acts against the victims of the charged crime, the
court held this evidence was admissible. The evidence that the defendant committed similar acts
against other, non-family members was reversed. The court stated that the evidence did not "establish
the defendant's particular system for committing the charged crime against the prosecutrix and fails
to establish a pattern of committing sexual offenses against the same prosecutrix." Id. at 481.
123. 629 So. 2d 1267 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993).
124. Id. at 1272.
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The court misapprehends the rationales behind both of these exceptions. In
order for the exception of motive to have independent relevance, there must be
some factually peculiar connexity between the crime charged and the defendant that
would distinguish the defendant from the general populace of like-minded child
abusers, each who have the same motive. 25 For the plan exception to be
independently relevant, the plan must be one of a larger scheme in which both
crimes were contemplated upon formation of the plan in the defendant's mind."
In State v. Howard,127 the defendant was convicted of aggravated rape and
aggravated crime against nature against his eleven-year-old daughter. The other
crimes evidence was testimony by another daughter that the defendant forced her
to have sex eight years earlier and had twice attempted to do so. These acts
allegedly occurred when the witness was approximately the same age as the present
victim.
In holding the evidence admissible to establish motive, the court said:
In the instant case, the evidence of previous sexual assaults against a
daughter at a period of time analogous to the current victim (pre-teen
years) and under similar circumstances (appellant intoxicated and alone
with the victim in that others are either away or asleep) demonstrated
motive and a plan to systematically engage in non-consensual relations
with his daughters as they matured physically.' 28
Likewise, in Driggers,the defendant was accused of molesting his niece and
several neighboring girls over a period of twenty-eight years. The court held the
evidence admissible to establish motive, stating:
[T]he other crimes evidence would tend to demonstrate that the
defendant generally took advantage of one-on-one situations with female
juveniles, that he was motivated by an unnatural interest in pre-pubescent
and adolescent females, and that the facts giving rise to the instant charges
did not occur fortuitously or accidently, but were fully intended by the
defendant.29
Later in the opinion, the court concluded that "the continuity and consistency
with which the other crimes occurred indicate a pattern of behavior and not merely
one or two isolated incidents. The significance of the other crimes lies as much in
what motivates defendant to act as in what occurred. His apparent tendency to
partake in pedophilic activities is of long standing and appears to be firmly

125. See, e.g., State v.Sutfield, 354 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1978).
126. See generally Pugh, supra note 2,at 32-33. Harmless error analysis was applied in
DeRoche. The court found that, even if the evidence was improperly admitted, it was harmless error.
DeRoche, 629 So. 2d at 1272-73. Therefore, the precedence of this case is questionable.
127. 520 So. 2d 1150 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987), writ denied, 526 So. 2d 790 (1988).
128. Id. at 1154.
129. State v. Driggers, 554 So. 2d 720, 724 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
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entrenched. '' 13° In Jackson, the court13 quoted the above language from Driggers,
adopting that case's reasoning fully. '
To accept that this evidence established the defendants' motives in committing

the crimes is to discard the rationale for the exception. To say a defendant is
"motivated by an unnatural interest in pre-pubescent and adolescent females" is to
say he is a pedophile. Only pedophiles are so inclined in their sexual desires. As
the court noted, this character "to partake in pedophilic activities is of long standing

and appears to be firmly entrenched." Thus, the defendant is a well-established
pedophile.

This reasoning is contrary to the accepted notion that the motive must be
something peculiar to the defendant relative to the victim rather than a general
motive, such as greed or propensity towards violence. The "motive reflected by
3
other crimes should be factually peculiar to the victim and the crime charged.' 1
VIII. THE DEPRAVED SEXUAL INSTINCT: A SPECIAL EXCEPTION IN SEXUAL
133
ABUSE CASES

As can be seen from the cases criticized above, it is frequently in cases of
sexual or child abuse that courts have a conceptual difficulty in properly applying
Article 404(B). As noted earlier, this arises from the difficulty courts have in
distinguishing between the first and second sentences of that article."3
Courts frequently attempt to force the contested evidence into one of the
enumerated exceptions in Article 404(B), resulting in strained interpretations of the
enumerated exceptions-interpretations not in accord with the traditionally
accepted rationales for those exceptions possessing independent relevance. 3

130. Id. at 727. See also State v. Hawkins, 633 So. 2d 301 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993). The
defendant was convicted of molesting his step-daughter. The contested evidence was the defendant's
conviction for incest with his daughter. The court stated: "The evidence of the defendant's
conviction of incest was admitted to show that the defendant had a system of past deviant behavior
with young female family members .. " Id.at 305.
131. State v. Jackson, 625 So. 2d 146, 151 (La. 1993). The court's reliance on Driggers
throughout the case may settle the question of the precedential value of Driggers. See La. Code
Evid. art. 404(B) author's note 4, at 298, in George W. Pugh et al., Handbook on Louisiana Evidence
Law (West 1994): "In light of the Supreme Court's decision reversing in part the Second Circuit
Court of Appeal's decision denying writs in State v. Bailey, 588 So. 2d 90 (La. 1991), the
precedential force of State v. Driggers seems very weak indeed."
132. Pugh, supra note 2, at 33-34.
133. See generally David J. Kaloganides, The Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory: An Example
of the Propensityfor AberrantApplication of Federal Rule ofEvidence 404(B),25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
1297 (1992).
134. See generally Ordover, supra note 6.
135. See, e.g., State v. Tolliver, 621 So. 2d 17 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993). In this case, the court
lists some of the different reasonings used by courts to find that the evidence in sex crime cases is
admissible:
Generally, evidence of other sex crimes committed by the accused against the same
victim or a similarly situated victim falls within one of the 404 B exceptions. For motive
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This strained interpretation of the second sentence of Article 404(B) is unneces36

sary.1

The listing in Article 404(B) is not exclusive. This should be clear from the
second sentence of the article which states: "It [evidence of specific instances of
the defendant's conduct] may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as ..... " This "such as" indicates the list which follows is not exclusive.
Further, the courts have allowed evidence of prior acts against the same victim
to prove the lustful disposition of the defendant towards that victim, 37 and to
corroborate the testimony of the victim. 3s Although the Louisiana Supreme
Court has yet to state that there is a separate exception in cases of child abuse, 39
or rapes of victims other than the victim of the crime with which the defendant is
presently charged, there is little doubt that in the case of the rape of a single victim
by the same defendant, there is a separate exception from those listed in Article
4
404(B).1

or lustful disposition toward the particular victim, see State v. Baker, 535 So.2d 861 (La.
App.2d Cir.1988), and State v. Howard,520 So.2d 1150 (La.App. 3d Cir.1987). For plan,
system, and opportunity, see State v. Acliese. 403 So.2d 665 (La. 1981). and State v.
Hanks, 593 So.2d 971 (La.App. 5th Cir.1992). For intent, see State v. Baker, 552 So.2d
617 (La.App.2d Cir.1989), writ denied, and State v. Moore, 534 So.2d 1275 (La.App. 4th
Cir.1988), writ denied.
Particularly, where the testimony shows that the factual circumstances of the prior acts
and the crime charged are virtually identical, the evidence of the other crimes is
corroborative of the victim's testimony and establishes a system or plan. Baker, 534
So.2d 861, Hanks, and Acliese, cited supra.
Id. at 19.
136. For a critical analysis of this trend, see Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of a Defendant's
UnchargedMisconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrine That Threatens to Engulf the Character
Evidence Prohibition,130 Mil. L. Rev. 41 (1990).
137. State v. Jackson, 625 So. 2d 146 (La. 1993); State v. Acliese. 403 So. 2d 665 (La. 1981);
State v. Long, 590 So. 2d 694 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
138. See, e.g., State v. Kahey, 436 So. 2d 475 (La. 1983).
139. "We have not recognized, however, an additional exception to the rule of exclusion which
would establish as automatic 'substantial relevancy' for other crimes evidence in cases of child
beatings or abuse." Id. at 488.
140. Evidence of other crimes related to the offense with which a defendant is charged is
inadmissible unless it fits with certain special exceptions. Aside from related offenses
admissible as part of the res gestae and convictions admissible for impeachment purposes,
Louisiana statutes provide for three exceptions-acts relevant to show intent, knowledge
or system. Louisiana courts have also recognized certain other exceptions including the
admissibility of prior sex crimes committed against the same prosecutrix.
State v. Kelly, 456 So. 2d 642, 648 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,461 So. 2d 312 (1984) (citations
omitted). See also State v. Dixon, 628 So. 2d 1295 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993); State v. Osborne, 593
So. 2d 888 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992) State v. Esponge, 593 So. 2d 677 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991); State
v. Long, 590 So. 2d 694 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991); State v. Rasberry, 564 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1990); State v. Baker, 552 So. 2d 617 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989), writ denied, 559 So. 2d 136
(1990); State v. Baker, 535 So. 2d 861 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988).
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Nonetheless, the courts are unquestionably generous in allowing evidence of
other extrinsic acts of thedefendant when the crime at issue is child abuse or sexual
abuse of any nature.
There are several rationales supporting the admissibility of this kind of
evidence. First, proponents assert the prior sexual misconduct is not offered into
evidence to show a general propensity for crime, but only to demonstrate a
propensity toward criminal activity with the same person. Second, they argue the
existence of similar crimes is probative of an ongoing relationship between the
defendant and the victim, which makes repetition of the crime particularly likely.
Finally, evidence of a lewd disposition is justified as providing necessary
background information to explain and give credence to the victim's testimony.""
Sometimes called the "Depraved Sexual Instinct" exception, this exception, which
is not one ofthose enumerated in Article 404(B), seems to have been accepted by
the Louisiana courts. 42 If so, this would go a long way in explaining the
otherwise untenable reasoning in cases such as Jackson and Driggers.
IX.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The case law in Louisiana is tending towards an expansive reading of Article
404(B). Evidence which does not satisfy the traditional requirements of admissible
other crimes evidence-possessing independent relevance other than propensity-is
routinely being admitted into evidence. Upon appeal this evidence is either found
to be properly admissible under the rule or, if inadmissible, is ruled to have been
43
harmless error.

This is wrong. The traditional rationales for these exceptions are as valid now
as they were when established. Character evidence is just as probative and relevant

as it ever was; it is also as prejudicial as it ever was. What has changed is societal
attitudes towards crime, especially violent crime, and most especially crimes

against women and children.
As noted throughout this comment, in cases of rape, child abuse, and sexual
abuse against children or women, courts have adopted an expansive reading of
Article 404(B). Through this expansion, courts have routinely admitted evidence
of other acts of the defendant in circumstances where the court's stated rationale for
the independent relevance does not satisfy any of the traditional rationales for

admissibility.'"

141. Brian E. Lam, The Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts in Sexual Assault Cases Under Alaska
Rule of Evidence 404(b)-An Emerging Double Standard, 5 Alaska L. Rev. 193 (1988).
142. For an examination of this exception in the federal arena and in other jurisdictions, see
Donner-Froelich, supra note 9; Mary Christine Hutton, Commentary: Prior Bad Acts Evidence in
Cases of Sexual Contact With a Child, 34 S.D. L. Rev. 604 (1989); John McCorvey, Corroboration
or Propensity? An Empty Distinction in the Admissibility of Similar Fact Evidence, 18 Stetson L.
Rev. 171 (1988).
143. See supra part III.
144. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 625 So. 2d 146 (La. 1993); State v. Thompson, 532 So. 2d 1160
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Nonetheless, in cases of child or sexual abuse, the defendants, perhaps even
more than a common thief, need the protections afforded by the general exclusion
of character evidence to prove propensity-few have not, at one point in their lives,
taken the thing of another; few have abused children or sexually abused another
person. If it is established in a jury's mind that a person once committed one of
these sexually heinous crimes, it will be a heartless jury indeed that will not
summarily convict the defendant. This may be true whether or not the prosecution
has established that the defendant committed the crime for which he is being tried.
In State v. Moore,14 then Justice Dixon summed it up in this fashion:
Evidence of previous criminal activity does affect the opinion of
those who sit in judgment. In fact, evidence of prior criminal activity has
such a strong influence on the finders of fact, reasonable or unreasonable,
logical or illogical, that such evidence, for this reason and this reason
alone, may be "too prejudicial." If the identity of the defendant rapist is
in doubt, it is too easy to believe that if he had committed such an offense
before he would do so again. Rape is a horrible crime, committed by bad
men. If the defendant committed such an offense before, it is too easy to
he is a bad man, and capable of the act with which he stands
believe that
46
accused. 1
In the same case, Justice Summers dissented. His dissent clearly demonstrates
the tension discussed above:
[T]he Court in total disregard of the reality of this bestial crime, embarks
upon a spurious academic dialogue in an effort to justify its reversal of
this conviction.
A new trial must be had, in which the victims of this defendant's
crimes must again appear in public, in Court, and recount the gruesome
details and the indignities to which they were subjected. If this is not
feasible-and often it is not-this defendant must be discharged. This
decision should offend the sensibilities of all decent citizens; 47it most
assuredly offends every recognized version ofjudicial restraint.
This author stands with Justice Dixon and rejects the position of Justice
Summers. Our criminal justice system was founded on constitutional considerA defendant must only be
ations of due process and fundamental fairness."

(La. 1988); State v. Germain, 433 So. 2d 110 (La. 1983); State v. Talbert, 416 So. 2d 97 (La. 1982);
State v. Humphrey, 612 So. 2d 507 (La. 1981); State v. Driggers, 554 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1989).
145. 278 So. 2d 781 (La.' 1972).
146. Id. at 787.
147. Id at 789-90 (Summers, J., dissenting).
148. See generally Glen Weissenberger, Making Sense of ExtrinsicAct Evidence: Federal Rule

19941

COMMENTS

tried for the crime for which she is charged and not for being a person of low
character that, regardless of her guilt in the present proceeding, should be removed
from society.
Present law suffices to effect this goal. There are ample procedural safeguards
currently in place to adequately protect a defendant from being convicted solely on
the basis of her bad character. 4 9 What is missing is a rigorous adherence to those
safeguards.
First, the prosecution must give notice to the defendant and the court of the
specific instances ofconduct which it intens to introduce into evidence against the
defendant. 50 Second, the prosecution must specify the exception it relies on
under Article 404(B) and establish that the specific instance satisfies the requirements of the exception.'
Third, there must be a determination made, by clear
and convincing evidence prior to trial, that the defendant committed the offense
which is to be admitted against her. This should be effected by a Louisiana Code
of Evidence article 104(A) determination in a Prieurhearing.'52 Fourth, even if

of Evidence 404(b), 70 Iowa L. Rev. 579 (1985).
149. See supra part III.
150. This would satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process, affording the defendant
time to prepare his defense.
151. This requirement satisfies the element of independent relevance. Unfortunately, this is
clearly one of the areas where our courts have not forced the prosecution to do its job under the law.
See State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973). Prieur is incorporated statutorily at La. Code Evid.
art. 1103. The courts refusal to force the prosecution to limit the range of exceptions to ones which
are genuinely and materially at issue is part of the reason why this area of the law is so confused.
Too, it is essential that the courts adhere to the traditional, and still recognized, rationales behind each
of these exceptions.
If the exception is one listed in La. Code Evid. art. 404(B) and satisfies the traditional rationale
for that specific exception, then the evidence will have independent relevance and the court's inquiry
is finished. If the exception is not one which is specifically listed in La. Code Evid. art. 404(B), the
court should jealously guard the purpose behind the rule and require the prosecution to establish why
the evidence has independent relevance.
In the case of child or sexual abuse cases, it would seem appropriate for the courts to fashion a
separate test for the admissibility of other crimes evidence. One author has suggested such a test
from which this author draws:
First, there must be some evidence other than the word of the victim that the crime has occurred.
Second, the prior offense must be substantially similar to the charged offense. Third, the defendant
must have the ability, at the time of the commission of the uncharged offense, to exert substantial
control over the victim. Finally, there must be a genuine issue at trial whether the crime has been
committed. See generally Donner-Froelich, supra note 9.
152. See Judith M.G. Patterson, Evidence of Prior Bad Acts: Admissibility Under the Federal
Rules, 38 Baylor L. Rev. 331 (1986), for a well-reasoned opinion of why the clear and convincing
standard should be retained. Although couched in terms of the federal rules, the reasoning would
seem equally applicable to Louisiana. This is especially true in cases where the prosecution relies
heavily on the other crimes evidence for conviction, i.e., when the prosecution's case is relatively
weak absent the extrinsic evidence of the defendant's other bad acts. While a jury may be reluctant
to convict a person on scant evidence (such as the bare assertion of the alleged victim), as soon as
evidence of the defendant's other crimes of the same nature are heard by the jury, there would be
little question that the jury will give the other crimes evidence undue weight; that is: the jury will
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satisfied that the conduct has been committed by the defendant and that the
evidence is such that it satisfies the exclusionary exceptions to Article 404(B), the
court must weigh the probative value and relevance against the potential for undue
prejudice to a defendant, utilizing the balancing test articulated in Louisiana Code
of Evidence article 403."'1 Fifth, if the evidence is admitted, the court should
instruct the jury on the proper use of the evidence immediately upon its admission
and in its final jury instructions.
This test is simply a reformulation of the requirements articulated in Prieurand
thejurisprudence following that seminal case. Adherence to the already established
rules and recognition of the rationales behind each of the exceptions to the general
exclusion of character evidence-a return to the requirement of independent
relevance-will solve many of the problems noted in the cases reported in this
comment. In the cases where the evidence does not fall squarely within one of the
enumerated exceptions, the courts must determine if the evidence has independent
relevance, prior to the introduction of the evidence.
The rationale for the rule of independent relevance is simple: a person cannot
be tried for being of bad character. Right or wrong, this doctrine is firmly
entrenched in our legal system. Predicated on constitutional notions of fundamental
fairness, this doctrine mandates that a defendant be tried only for the crime
charged-not for being of criminal character. The failure of the courts to adhere
to the requirement of independent relevance may well deprive the defendant of her
constitutional right to a fair trial-to be prosecuted and convicted solely on the
basis of the prosecution's introduction of evidence which establishes beyond a
reasonable doubt her guilt of each and every element of the charged crime.
Huey L.G6lden

more fully believe that the defendant, having committed the same act once, did so in the case at bar.
The clear and convincing standard will alleviate many of these problems, as will the requirement that
the determination be prior to the jury hearing the evidence.
Here, again, it should be noted by 1994 La. Acts No. 51, the legislature amended Article 404(B).
A note accompanying the amendment indicates the legislature intends the pre-trial finding required
by Prieur (that the defendant committed the uncharged act) to follow the federal jurisprudence, i.e.,
areasonable jury could conclude the defendant committed the act. See supra text accompanying note

27.
153. Thus, the judge must exclude the evidence if it unduly prejudices the defendant. Prejudice
means that the defendant is unable to adequately defend against the uncharged conduct, that the jury
will improperly confuse the charged crime with the uncharged conduct, and that the defendant will
not be afforded her constitutional right to have the prosecution prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
each and every element of the charged crime.

